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The manufacturing productivity gap between the U.S. and the U.K. became much 
larger during the interwar period than existing estimates suggest. This paper presents 
a new estimate based on real value added and hours worked. First, a detailed 
benchmark comparison for 1935 is constructed using official industrial census reports. 
Second, structural shift methodology is applied to analyse productivity movements for 
industrial branches in the period 1900-1957. U.S. manufacturing shows high 
comparative levels and growth rates for chemicals and engineering. These results 
support revisionist accounts of Robert Gordon and Alexander Field on the 
Depression’s strengthening of American productivity leadership. 
                                                 
1 We have received helpful comments and suggestions from Steve Broadberry, Stanley Engerman, 
Knick Harley, Angus Maddison, Patrick O’Brien, and participants of the 2007 EHES conference in 
Lund, the Hi-Stat workshop on Historical Comparisons of International Income and Productivities, 26 
September 2007 in Tokyo and the conference ‘Economic Structure and Performance of Nations’ 21-22 
February 2008 in  Groningen. We are responsible for all errors. Pieter Woltjer’s research was supported 
by a grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).  
A Comparison of Real Output and Productivity for British and 
American Manufacturing in 1935 
 
The large productivity lead that the United States achieved over Western Europe by 
the mid-twentieth century is one of the most characteristic long term aspects of 
American economic development. Whether it was created by ‘good fortune, Yankee 
ingenuity, or European stupidity’, however, still remains an open question.2 The 
present study contributes to the issue of when and how manufacturing labour 
productivity in the United States moved way ahead of Great Britain and of continental 
Europe. The question why American industry achieved superior efficiency is well-
covered by the Rothbarth-Habakkuk thesis and supplementary refinements by others: 
Already by the nineteenth century the scarcity of labour and capital relative to land 
had stimulated manufacturing firms in America to economize on shopfloor labour and 
capital, resulting in high levels of productivity.3 Additionally, American producers 
faced a large domestic market for standardized products.4 Together with abundance of 
nonreproducible resources the American economy was able to apply high-throughput 
production methods, and to maximize levels of capacity utilization by making use of 
new technically and managerially advanced corporate institutions.5 By the start of 
twentieth century the United States had established a position of leadership in mass 
production and mass distribution industries. The persistence of U.S. leadership into 
the twentieth century has been explained by path dependency in investment patterns 
and by a fast rise of high technology industries with important complementarities in 
physical and human capital accumulation.6 Thus the interwar period showed a 
considerable productivity growth in American manufacturing with a crucial role for 
the automobile industry, electrification and science based industries. Richard Nelson 
and Gavin Wright have mentioned the rise of electrical and chemical engineering in 
particular. The shift from coal to petroleum as the basic feedstock for chemical plants 
is seen as a ‘…remarkable blend of mass production, advanced science, and American 
resources.’7 But the question of the ‘when and how’ of the  productivity gap vis-à-vis 
Europe’s first industrializer Great Britain lies foremost in the realm of statistics, to 
which we will turn in the following. 
 
                                                 
2 Hannah, ‘Logistics’, p. 74. 
3 Temin, ‘Labor’; Field, ‘Land’. 
4 Rothbarth, ‘Causes’, pp. 385-86; Habakkuk, American, see for example pp. 53-54, 75-77, 121-124; 
Engerman and Sokoloff, ‘Technology’. The argument of an alleged favorable American market scale 
has recently been attacked by Hannah, ‘Logistics’, pp. 58, 66, 68. 
5 Chandler, Scale; Nelson and Wright, ‘Rise’, pp. 1938-1940. However, there are important exceptions 
in cotton textiles, see e.g. Leunig, ‘British’, and in tobacco, see Hannah, ‘Whig Fable’. 
6 David, Technical Choice; Broadberry, Productivity Race; Nelson and Wright, ‘Rise’. 
7 Ibid., p. 1946. See also Mowery and Rosenberg, ‘Twentieth-Century’. 
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I. WHAT THE DATA SHOW 
 
The issue of the precise timing of the U.S. taking over in manufacturing in the 
nineteenth century seems to have been settled by now. A recent study by Stephen 
Broadberry and Douglas Irwin has come forward with a new benchmark for 1850. 
This was a response to the claims made by Leandro Prados de la Escosura and 
Marianne Ward and John Devereux that the U.S. has overtaken the U.K. much earlier 
than backward projections on the basis of 1990 level estimates of Angus Maddison 
suggest.8 The new estimate shows that total economy labour productivity in the U.S. 
surpassed the U.K.-level around 1890. But for manufacturing alone it shows that as 
early as 1840 U.S. productivity was already twice as high as the British level. The size 
of this gap remained nearly two-to-one for the rest of the century, confirming earlier 
findings of Broadberry.9 Consequently, the overtaking of the U.K. by the U.S. in total 
economy productivity was mainly the result of a shift from labour out of agriculture 
and of comparative productivity increases in the service sector.10 
According to statistical evidence collected by Broadberry the persistence of 
the manufacturing productivity gap between the U.S. and the U.K. was carried over 
into the twentieth century. But there seems to be no clear trend in the movement of 
comparative performance: ‘…Labour productivity in U.S. manufacturing has 
fluctuated around a level of about twice the British level…’11 Deviations from this 
long term equilibrium were being associated with the disruptions brought on by the 
two world wars. Again the message is that the United States’ surging ahead at the 
whole economy level took place outside manufacturing. From his own figures 
Broadberry concluded that Britain and Germany failed to close the gap on the United 
States in the interwar period; the gap widened during the 1920s, but was followed by 
a ‘temporary cyclical narrowing’ during the Great Depression.12 
Recent studies, however, have emphasized the Depression’s contribution to 
growth of potential output in the American economy. Both Robert Gordon and 
Alexander Field have shown that American growth in the first part of the twentieth 
century has been exceptionally high, especially between 1929 and 1941.13 Field 
conjectures that the United States’ fastest productivity growth took place in the 
middle of the depression of the 1930s and not during WWII.14 During the interwar 
                                                 
8 Maddison, Monitoring; Prados de la Escosura, ‘International’; Ward and Devereux, ‘Measuring’.  
9 Broadberry and Irwin, ‘Labor productivity’,  p. 265. 
10 Hannah, ‘American’, p. 203. 
11 Broadberry, Productivity Race, p. 3. For the period after WWII Broadberry reported comparative 
U.S./U.K. levels of 2.5/1 until 1960, followed by a decline. 
12 Broadberry, Productivity Race, p. 291. See also Temin, ‘Golden Age’, who explains the fast post-
1945 growth by pointing at an arrested development of structural change in many European countries 
between 1914 and 1945. 
13 Gordon, ‘U.S. Economic Growth’, pp. 123-28. 
14 Field, ‘Most’, p. 1399: ‘…the years 1929-1941 were, in the aggregate, the most technologically 
progressive of any comparable period in U.S. economic history ….’ 
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years the foundations were laid for much of the U.S. productivity growth of the 
1950s: ‘…the golden age (1948-1973) no longer has to be understood sui generis, but 
can be seen as a period reflecting the extension and persistence of trends and 
technological foundations established during the interwar period... It overturns the 
conventional wisdom attributing achieved 1948 productivity levels principally to the 
war…’15 Thus, the Great Depression did not push down the underlying productivity 
trend of the American economy, suggesting that the gap with Europe has widened 
further. 
How does this new view of U.S. growth compare with developments in 
Europe and the rest of the world? Field mentions a widening gap of productivity 
levels between the U.S. and Europe and Japan already before WWII, but he does not 
come forward with comparative evidence.16 If we focus here on manufacturing alone 
we find on the basis of existing estimates a U.S./U.K. comparative productivity level 
of 250 in 1929 and of 192 in 1938 on a per worker basis, revealing a relative decrease 
of U.S. comparative productivity.17 This estimate sits uncomfortably with Field’s 
revisionist account of U.S. manufacturing productivity during the Depression. Doubts 
are strengthened by the fact that many existing studies provide a rather bleak picture 
of British manufacturing performance during the 1930s. In the literature we find a 
critical account of the functioning of British capital markets, competition in product 
markets and effects of industrial relations, which were not very favorable for long-run 
productivity performance.18 There was a shortfall on a broad front nurtured by a ‘cosy 
collusive environment’, that presumably differed a lot from the U.S. competitive 
environment characterized by modern anti trust legislation.19  
Given these contrasting views on the United States’ economy opening up the 
full possibilities of the Second Industrial Revolution and the political and economic 
disarray of Europe between 1914 and 1945 the alleged persistence of a nineteenth and 
twentieth century U.S./U.K. manufacturing productivity gap of roughly 2:1 is 
therefore in need of attention.  
The most important quantitative assessment of the comparative performance 
of the British and American economies in the 1930s is the widely used study of 
Laszlo Rostas.20 Many studies of relative U.S./U.K. performance, including the 
                                                 
15 Field, ‘Origins’, p. 65; Field, ‘Technological’, pp. 205, 216, and 228: Between 1929 and 1941 TFP 
growth in the nonfarm economy grew at a rate of 2.31 percent per year, being ‘the highest peak to 
peacetime peak rate of the century’. Almost 50 percent of TFP growth originated from the 
manufacturing sector. Between 1919 and 1929 total TFP growth was 2.02 percent per year, with 
manufacturing’s contribution estimated at more than 80 percent. 
16 Field, ‘Equipment’, p. 49. 
17 Broadberry, Productivity Race, p. 2; see also Broadberry and Crafts, ‘Britain’s’, pp. 532-33: TFP 
growth in the British economy has been estimated at 1.9 percent between 1924 and 1937. 
18 Crafts, ‘Long-run growth’, p. 22. 
19 Eichengreen, British Economy, p. 340. See Booth, ‘ Manufacturing’, for a revisionist interpretation 
of U.K. manufacturing performance in the trans-WWII period.  
20 Rostas, Comparative. 
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quantitative assessments of Broadberry and Broadberry and Crafts rely on Rostas’s 
detailed study of physical output per worker from the manufacturing censuses of the 
U.K. (1935) and the U.S. (1937/39). Being very sophisticated at the moment it was 
published, we believe that this comparison needs to be revised and completed 
according to modern standards. The study of Rostas is based on 31 industries only, 
covering less than half of total manufacturing output. It uses physical output per 
worker as a measure of productivity performance instead of real value added per 
working hour, and it applies different census-reporting years between the U.K. and 
the U.S. Therefore it is hard to make the results of his comparisons consistent with the 
methods of historical national accounting that are being applied today. 
In the present study we introduce new methods of U.S./U.K.comparison and 
focus on one common census year for both countries, being 1935, to guarantee 
complete and consistent coverage of all industries that were reported in the census. 
We use real value added as the measure of output and productivity of industries 
instead of ‘traditional’ indicators like physical output per worker. First, we present 
comparative estimates of gross output, value added and labour productivity for the 
complete set of industries and industrial branches in manufacturing. Next, we 
calculate specific prices for product items directly from the British and the American 
census reports. Input price levels will be compared as well, to perform a double 
deflation analysis. These prices will be combined into new purchasing power parities 
(PPP) that will be used to deflate value added for each industry and branch. Finally, 
adjustments will be made for the number of actual hours worked. We show that aside 
from the construction of new comparative value added estimates, the adjustment for 
the variation in the interwar workweek between the U.S. and the U.K. is an important 
factor in reconciling the different positions in the Anglo-American productivity 
debate. 
One of the central findings in this study is that the Anglo-American 
productivity gap during the 1930s was not persistent and has become much wider than 
existing estimates show, when we adjust for hours worked. The new estimates display 
larger cross-industry variations in productivity levels than those resulting from 
Rostas’s study and present a clear picture of the key-industries that were responsible 
for widening the gap between American and British manufacturing performance. 
 
 
II. THE CENSUS DATA OF 1935 
 
The data for our benchmark comparison come from the official production censuses. 
For the United Kingdom we used the Fifth Census of Production of 1935, published 
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by the Business Statistics Office (BSO) of the Board of Trade.21 For the United States 
we took the Biennial Census of Manufactures of 1935, published by the Bureau of the 
Census of the U.S. Department of Commerce.22 Both surveys contain detailed 
information on quantities and values of produced items, average prices, gross output, 
intermediate input, and employment. As the information for outputs and inputs is 
based on one and the same questionnaire - for which the information is supplied on 
the level of firms - internal consistency is guaranteed. Appendix A discusses the 
comparability of both censuses. 
 Business cycle and capacity utilization effects can have a significant influence 
on the measurement of output and productivity levels for one particular year. Rostas 
addressed this issue in his study of prewar British and American manufacturing and 
decided that 1937 was the best year for comparison, because the degree of capacity 
utilization was roughly similar in both economies.23 But statistical material related to 
all manufacturing in the U.K. was not fully available for this year. The Import Duties 
Act Inquiry of 1937 does cover some of the manufacturing branches, but the majority 
of the manufacturing industries were not yet tabulated or published by the time Rostas 
started his study.24 To overcome this problem he chose to compare the year 1935 for 
Britain with the year 1939 for the United States working back towards 1937. The 
primary reason why Rostas relied so heavily on the American 1939 Biennial Census 
of Manufactures and not the 1935 or 1937 censuses is that it met the sizable data 
requirements of the quantitative study he employed.25 
We believe that for the purpose of the present paper, the 1935-censuses for the 
U.K. and the U.S. are a good match. They allow us to provide a systematic and 
detailed assessment of all manufacturing industries in both economies. The British 
census distinguishes 108 manufacturing industries or trades, whereas the American 
census covers 327 industries and sub-industries. We have reclassified the industries of 
both countries into 12 branches and 93 common industries based on the classification 
of the U.K. Census (see Appendix B for further details).26 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Potential effects of the business cycle can be detected by making use of existing 
productivity time series to calculate the average movement in productivity levels in 
                                                 
21 Board of Trade, Final Report. 
22 U.S. Department of Commerce, Biennial Census, 1935. 
23 Rostas, Comparative, p. 24. 
24 Board of Trade, Preliminary Reports. 
25 This particular census is part of the 1940 decennial census and contains detailed figures on the size of 
plants, horse power of machinery installed, and so on. See: U.S. Department of Commerce, Sixteenth 
Decennial Census. 
26 The production censuses cover not only the entire manufacturing sector, but contain also data on 
mining, construction works, public utilities and government industries. For the purpose of this study we 
will exclude the latter industries and focus primarily on the manufacturing sector. 
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the manufacturing sector for both countries between 1935 and 1937. The projection of 
the comparative productivity figures for the U.K. and the U.S. shows however that the 
comparative levels of productivity in 1935 do not differ from 1937.27 Unemployment 
levels for both countries are presented in Figure 1 illustrating that the British and 
American business cycles moved correspondingly. This diminishes the scope for 
cyclical effects on productivity levels resulting from differences in capacity utilization 
and differential consequences of labour hoarding or selective retention between both 
countries. 
 
III. CALCULATING REAL VALUE ADDED 
 
This study presents comparative levels of output and productivity by systematically 
measuring the production of industries, which is also known as the industry-of-origin 
approach. Using this approach one can apply either the quantity or the value method. 
The first method was used by Rostas who made direct comparisons of physical 
quantities of output (in tons, gallons, or units). The second procedure measures the 
value of gross output and net output by industry (in national currency) which is then 
translated into a common currency with a sector-specific purchasing power parity (PPP) 
adjusted price ratio. As Deborah Paige and Gottfried Bombach have demonstrated, 
suitable conversion factors can be obtained by constructing so-called industry-of-
origin PPPs from either output price data alone (single deflation) or from price data 
for outputs as well as intermediate inputs (double deflation).28 We used their method 
and calculated average factory gate prices from the values and quantities of the items 
reported in the official production censuses of both countries for the year 1935. 
 The first step in the calculation of the PPPs is the matching of products between 
the two countries. The level of detail of the census data with respect to output allowed 
us to match 361 products (see Appendix C for further details). On the intermediate 
input side we could match 67 input items (only in textiles and iron and steel, see 
Appendix D for further details). An average value of a product or an intermediate 
input, the unit value (UV), reflects the domestic producer price of an item. Next, unit 
value ratios (UVR) of identical products in both countries have been calculated and 
aggregated into a specific industry or branch purchasing power parity. With this PPP 
output and intermediate inputs of the two countries were translated into a common 
currency.29  
                                                 
27 Broadberry, Productivity Race, p. 44.  
28 The pioneering study using currency conversions factors for international comparisons is Paige and 
Bombach, Comparison. 
29 The methodology and formulae’s that we applied are broadly similar to the procedures that were 
used in the study on British and German manufacturing by Rainer Fremdling, Herman de Jong and 
Marcel Timmer. We therefore refer to this study for the description of the methodology applied in the 
present paper. Fremdling et al., ‘ British and German;’ The methodology is also described in Fremdling 
et al., ‘Censuses Compared’, www.ggdc.net 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 features the Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher Gross Output PPPs per branch and 
for total manufacturing. These PPPs are based solely on output UVRs, aggregated to 
the branch and sector level using a stratified sampling approach.30 For this bilateral 
comparisons the weights of either the base country (U.K.) or the other country (U.S.) 
can be used, which provide a Laspeyres and a Paasche type PPP respectively. We 
used the geometric average of the Laspeyres and Paasche indices, the Fisher index, as 
the currency conversion factor for our productivity comparisons, which is considered 
common practice in this type of research. The overall Fisher Gross Output PPP is 4.84 
U.S. dollar per pound sterling, which is very close to the official exchange rate of 4.94 
dollar. But the large cross-industry variation of the output PPPs shows that the 
exchange rate would function poorly as a PPP on a sector level. 
Direct quantity and price information for inputs is not widely available in the 
American census. By definition inputs for one industry are made up of the output of 
another industry; the intermediate input PPP for an industry can thus be derived as a 
weighted set of output UVRs from the industries furnishing its inputs. Therefore, we 
calculated intermediate input PPPs in the following way. We took the detailed Anglo-
American output UVRs for all manufacturing output items as described above. Next 
we applied weights that were constructed with information on the flow of goods 
between industries from existing input-output tables. We used the 1935-table for the 
U.K. by Tibor Barna and for the U.S. we applied the 1939-table by Wassily 
Leontief.31 These input-output tables reveal that the large majority of the intermediate 
inputs for manufacturing industries originate from within the manufacturing sector 
itself. E.g. in the large clothing and engineering trades nearly 90 percent of the inputs 
came from other manufacturing industries. We have worked solely with ex-factory 
output prices. We did not take differences in the cost of transport or trade margins into 
account, because the differences in these costs for both countries are unlikely to be so 
large as to have a substantial effect on the resulting input PPPs. We therefore 
                                                 
30 A detailed description of the stratified sampling approach is provided in Timmer, Asian 
Manufacturing. In the present study the minimum number of matches for a sample to be accepted was 
2 with a coefficient of variation of 10 percent at maximum. The coefficient of variation is given by the 
expression below; where Ij is the number of matches for industry ‘j’; wij the relative weight of product 
‘i’ in the total value of production of industry ‘j’; UVRij the unit value ratio of product ‘i’; and UVRj 
the unit value ratio, or purchasing power parity, of industry ‘j’. 
 



















31 Barna, ‘Interdependence’; Leontief, The Structure. 
 8
implicitly assumed the trade and transport margins (relative to total costs) to be 
similar for both countries. 
To construct the intermediate input PPPs we first estimated the American 
1935 input-output table based on the available 1939 table. We adjusted the row and 
column totals for the 1939 input-output table to the 1935 gross output and 
intermediate inputs taken from the 1935 Census of Manufacturing. The changes in the 
structure of the manufacturing sector could then be translated to the cells of the matrix 
itself to create a fit as close as possible to the original input-output table. Secondly, 
based on the structure of the British manufacturing sector, the Laspeyres output PPPs 
for products that are used further on in the production process (thus excluding the 
PPPs for final product) were then weighted by the flow of goods in the British input-
output table to estimate industry and branch specific intermediate input PPPs. The 
same was done for the U.S.; in this case the resulting PPPs were based on the 
American structure and Paasche PPPs. Only for the building materials and timber 
trades we were not able to construct PPPs for intermediate inputs. 
 In addition to the gross output PPPs Table 1 also presents the intermediate 
input PPPs and the resulting double deflated value added PPPs. Fortunately, for the 
textile and iron and steel industries the American census does provide specific value 
and quantity data on intermediate inputs. Therefore, we could also derive direct input 
PPPs for these two large branches, which made it possible to cross-check the 
reliability of the results we got from the input-output approach. The Fisher 
intermediate input PPPs between brackets are based on input unit values derived 
directly from the manufacturing censuses, whereas all other intermediate input PPPs 
are derived from the input-output procedure. For the textile and iron and steel trades 
the intermediate input PPPs constructed by the alternative procedures differ within a 
margin of less than four percent, which we believe is reassuringly close and justifies 
our procedure of using the input-output tables to calculate input prices. Table 1 also 
shows that in some large branches PPPs for inputs are very different from those for 
output, notably in clothing, chemicals and engineering. 
 
IV. A NEW COMPARISON OF U.S./U.K. PRODUCTIVITY FOR 1935 
 
Table 2 gives the new estimates of double deflated labour productivity (real value 
added per worker). The second column shows value added per worker deflated by the 
official exchange rate. As can be expected, the use of the official exchange rate 
smoothes out the differences in labour productivity across branches. Effects are large 
in engineering, food and beverages, and paper. 
 
[Table 2 about here]  
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In addition to the exchange rate comparison, we also listed the outcome of the 
industry-of-origin study by Rostas based on physical indicators.32 Whereas we were 
able to draw on nearly complete sets for all manufacturing industries in the censuses, 
Rostas’s choice was dictated by the availability of 31 pairs of industries for which 
quantity and employment data was available in the statistics for both countries. Being 
well aware of the possible deficiencies he stated that ‘…our comparison covers not 
more than half of the output and only about 31 industries, while both Censuses 
distinguish well over 100 individual industries. Such important industries as ship-
building, non-ferrous metals, timber, heavy chemicals, petroleum refining (in the 
U.S.), tailoring, printing, leather, were not included in the sample.’33 
To compare our results with those of Rostas we took, as far as possible, the 
same years (mostly 1935) and used an implicit weighting method to aggregate 
Rostas’s comparative (physical) productivity estimates.34 Whereas we arrived at an 
aggregate U.S./U.K. level of 224 percent, the estimate of Rostas amounted to 212. On 
the branch level however, the differences between both estimates are substantial. 
There is a difference of 22 percent with Rostas’s estimates for the food, drink and 
tobacco industries (the U.S. advantage is 22 percent lower). We estimated a higher 
advantage for the U.S. in clothing (42 percent higher), chemicals (24 percent), and in 
engineering (25 percent) compared with the estimates of Rostas. These differences 
can be tracked down to the industry level, where the estimates by Rostas deviate even 
further from our own. In general the discrepancies come from the practical 
deficiencies of the quantity approach as well as the various additional shortcomings of 
the research strategy he employed. In particular his use of different census years for 
the benchmark estimate posed a problem in practice. We supply some illustrations of 
this in the remainder of the section. 
 Our present estimate reveals a clear American productivity lead in the large 
tailoring, dressmaking and millinery trade, which raises the overall comparative 
productivity in the clothing branch significantly compared to the original estimate. 
The only industry covered by Rostas in the clothing trades was the boots and shoe 
trade, about 25 percent of the total size of the branch. Rostas’s relatively low estimate 
for this industry can most likely be explained by the non-homogeneity of the end-
products for this category. He had to rely on a rather rudimentary conversion factor 
and in addition had to integrate the sizable American ‘boot and shoe, cut stock and 
findings’ trades into the industry.  
                                                 
32 Rostas, Comparative. 
33 Ibid., p. 29. 
34 This procedure is based on the assumption that the representativity of PPPs of the covered industries 
for uncovered industries is better than that of productivity in these industries. Implicitly weighted 
comparative productivity figures can be attained by transforming the comparative productivity figures 
based on the quantitative approach into implicit PPPs using the available census data. These implicit 
industry PPPs can then be weighted by gross output to obtain implicit Gross Output PPPs, which in 
turn can be used to calculate comparative productivity estimates on the branch and sector level. 
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The differences in the estimates for the chemical and allied trades reflect another 
crucial weakness in the quantity approach adopted by Rostas. Because of its complex 
structure he was not able to deal with the section of chemicals, dyestuffs, and drugs. 
As this industry encompasses well over 200 appreciably different products, it was 
simply not possible for Rostas to find a common conversion factor, or to assign labour 
to the various products. Consequently Rostas had to omit this industry, even though it 
is by far the largest industry of the branch. Our new estimate of the chemical and 
allied trades - which includes the chemicals, dyestuffs and drugs trades and is based 
on 83 important products in this category (see Table 3 and Appendix C for further 
details) - thus presents a major improvement over the original estimation. 
 This study confirms the large productivity lead of the U.S. in the engineering, 
shipbuilding and vehicles trades. The extent of the American lead in engineering, 
however, is understated substantially by the method of Rostas, because it does not 
take the cross-country differences in the comparative price ratios between inputs and 
outputs into account, which as we noted before can have a large effect on the 
comparative productivity estimate. Furthermore, as Rostas used quantity indicators of 
output for his comparison, his estimates reflect gross output per head instead of value 
added per head, thus ignoring the role of intermediate inputs. Rostas noted the latter 
point as a major limitation of his quantity approach but was unable to address it at the 
time.35 Table 3 presents some details on the comparative productivity of industries. It 
shows that it is feasible to calculate double deflated estimates of real value added on 
the level of specific industries.  
 
[Table 3 about here]  
 
Overall, the discrepancies between our new estimates and the quantity method 
fundamentally challenge studies relying on Rostas’s disaggregated figures. The study 
by Rostas is less representative for the total manufacturing sector and the 
methodology applied is unable to account for the effects of differing prices and 
volumes of intermediate inputs used in the British and American production process. 
Studies using Rostas’s estimates in analyzing comparative productivity figures for 
British and American manufacturing industries are undoubtedly biased. Regardless of 
the shortcomings of his approach though, the comparative productivity estimate by 
Rostas for the manufacturing sector as a whole is remarkably close to the present 
estimate. This may be seen as good news for those studies that continue to use 
quantity comparisons on the practical grounds that there are insufficiently reliable 
prices available. However we firmly believe that this result for the total 
manufacturing sector is more likely to mirror the hard work and impeccable judgment 
                                                 
35 Rostas, Comparative, p. 3. 
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of Lazlo Rostas than the validity of using physical quantities as the only measure in 
productivity comparisons. 
 
V. ADJUSTING FOR ACTUAL HOURS WORKED 
 
Most historical cross-country productivity comparisons apply the concept of output 
per worker or real value added per worker. However, we think that in the present 
context real value added per man-hour is the preferred indicator of labour 
productivity, as it is best suited to the concepts of economic efficiency and 
technological capabilities mentioned in the introductory section. It is also more 
relevant here, since Field has based his story of fast U.S. productivity growth during 
the Great Depression on John Kendrick’s estimates of manufacturing output per hour 
(and not output per worker).36 For the present study this distinction is of particular 
importance since the decline in weekly actual hours worked in the U.S. during the 
1930s was more pronounced that in Britain. The practice of work-sharing was 
widespread in the American Depression-economy. If we do not adjust for this we 
would underestimate U.S. comparative productivity. Colin Clark estimated the 
average working week in Great Britain in 1935 at 47.8 hours, compared to only 37.2 
hours in the United States.37 Likewise, Rostas assumed the average length of the U.K. 
and U.S. working week to be 47.8 and 36.6 hours respectively. However, he did not 
analyze the effects of this gap in working hours on the actual level of Anglo-
American comparative productivity.38 The lower levels of American working hours 
are confirmed in the study of actual hours of work per week by Ethel Jones.39 For the 
U.K. systematic evidence is more difficult to find.40 Some occasionally published 
government statistics give the percentage of short-time workers and the level of short-
time work.41 However, we made estimates of actual hours worked on the basis of 
information given by Robert Hart, and Michael Huberman and Chris Minns.42 The 
actual hours of work per week for the U.K. and the U.S. from 1929 up to 1938 are 
given in Figure 2. We also included Germany for this specific case. It shows that 
actual working hours in the American economy declined during the larger part of the 
1930s, resulting in an American working week in the manufacturing sector which was 
                                                 
36 Kendrick, Productivity, pp. 466-75. 
37 Colin Clark, Conditions,  p. 68. 
38 Rostas, Comparative, pp. 25, 27, 29, 43-44, 48-49. He did not adjust for hours worked for two 
reasons. First, he was more interested towards measuring man-power requirements than to measure the 
effect of comparative productivity on production costs. Second, he (mistakenly) held the belief that the 
relatively short hours in the U.S. were part and parcel of the mass-production methods and for that 
reason per worker comparisons would be more realistic. 
39 Jones, ‘New Estimates’; see also ILO, Year-book, 1939 and Sutch and Carter, Historical Statistics of 
the United States. 
40 Whiteside and Gillespie, ‘Deconstructing’, pp. 674, 677. 
41 Thomas, ‘Labour market’, p. 136. 
42 Hart, ‘Hours’;  Huberman and Minns, ‘Times’. 
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much shorter than the British and German one. From 1929 onwards the British 
working week became only slightly shorter due to the introduction of short-time, but 
by 1934 the average working week had basically returned to the pre-Depression level. 
However, the American average actual working week dropped by nearly 30 percent in 
the period 1929 to 1934 and it did not attain its pre-Depression level again. Only 
during a short period in the 1940s the number of weekly hours in American 
manufacturing rose to 44. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
We can also adjust for differences in the number of holidays and vacations and for 
variations in working hours per branch. The Yearbook of Labor Statistics of 1939 
contains detailed statistics on average hours of work per worker per week for several 
industries and industry-groups for both the U.K. and the U.S. We weighed these 
outcomes by employment to obtain the familiar branch classification that adheres to 
the British Census of Production.43 Data by Huberman and Minns on the number of 
vacations and holidays for the U.K. and U.S. in 1938 allowed us to construct the total 
number of annual hours worked. The data on weekly and annual average hours 
worked in 1935 are presented in Table 4. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Both Figure 2 and Table 4 illustrate that during the 1930s the declines in weekly 
hours in the United States were ‘deep, prolonged, and widespread.’44 The explanation 
for the persistence of high unemployment lies beyond the scope of this paper. But we 
will shortly touch upon the causes of the widespread practice of American short-time 
working. Ben Bernanke explained the drop of the American workweek and the 
introduction of work-sharing as an efficient way of firms to react to falling demand: 
firms cut production by running certain operations only part time; at the same time the 
work force was left intact by spread-work schedules. Firms recognized that a 
proportional cut in wages would bring workers below their subsistence level, hence 
real hourly earnings rose, which explains a countercyclical pattern in real wage 
rates.45 Robert Margo has argued that the legislation connected to the National 
Industry Recovery Act (1933-1935) promoted worksharing provisions leading to 
reductions in the length of the workweek. The New Deal legislation as such had 
created a climate that made wage cutting difficult.46 
                                                 
43 ILO, Year-book, 1939. 
44 Margo, ‘Employment’, p. 48. 
45 Bernanke, ‘Employment’, p. 89. 
46 Margo, ‘Microeconomics’, p. 339. 
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In Britain short-time working had been a traditional response to trade recessions, and 
it developed in the 1920s systematically into the so-called OXO-system, an 
arrangement for days of work (O) and leisure (X).47 The cuts in working time in 
British firms during the interwar period have been explained by the high benefit-wage 
ratio and by hourly wage rate inertia through centralized wage bargaining. But it was 
not as widespread and extensive as in the U.S.48  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 presents labour productivity statistics on a man-hour basis. The branch 
specific employment data has been multiplied by the data on annual hours worked 
from Table 5. This results in an average level of American labour productivity per 
hour for total manufacturing of 279 percent of the British level, which is 55 percent 
points (or 25 percent) higher than the productivity per worker estimate. On the level 
of branches the rise in labour productivity ranges from 16 percent (food, drink and 
tobacco trades) up to 34 percent (clothing trades). In 1935 hourly productivity in U.S. 
manufacturing was nearly three times as high as in the U.K. Hourly levels were high 
in the engineering branch, whereas the differences in textiles and food remained 
relatively modest. 
These new results seem difficult to reconcile with the earlier mentioned 
outcomes of Rostas’s benchmark estimate and Broadberry’s reworking of it. The 
latter has based his backward and forward time series projections of Anglo-American 
productivity on the per worker comparisons of Rostas. By making these 
extrapolations Broadberry implicitly assumed that working hours have moved 
correspondingly in the U.K. and the U.S. We have shown that this was not the case in 
the interwar period. The uninterrupted line in Figure 3 gives the comparative labour 
productivity for the American and British manufacturing sector over the period 1889-
1989 on a per worker basis, which is similar to the overview of comparative 
manufacturing productivity in the work of Broadberry.49 With our new information 
on differential working hours we projected a time series backward and forward from 
the 1935-benchmark level of 279, but now on an hourly basis. We applied the same 
time series on output and employment as Broadberry, and adjusted it for the 
                                                 
47 Thomas, ‘Labour Market’, 135-136; Bowden et al, ‘Underemployment’, pp. 97-98. In the British 
cotton-spinning industry short-time working and price maintenance schemes were two sides of the 
same coin, and ensured the survival of many marginal firms constraining the exit process. See Bowden 
and Higgins, ‘Short-time working’, p. 329: ‘Under the system of unemployment provision, public 
unemployment benefit for short-time working subsidized the retention of labour. Unemployment 
provision and short-time working subsidized operating costs’.  
48 Estimates based on information from Dale, ‘Interpretation’, pp. 89-90 reveal that in 1934  for 
manufacturing as a whole the effect of short-time schemes on the standard working week was not 
larger than 3.5 percent. See also Hart, ‘Hours’, p. 500; Bowden and Higgins, ‘Short-time working’, p. 
333.  
49 Broadberry, Productivity Race, p 2. 
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movements of average weekly hours per worker in both countries. This new graph 
reveals that the level of comparative value added per man-hour was slightly below the 
level of value added per worker in 1889. At the end of the nineteenth century the U.S. 
had a labour productivity lead of about twice the level of the U.K. From the final 
decades of the nineteenth century the comparative American level increased, per 
worker as well as per hour. The two series move in unison up to the year 1929. After 
1929 however, the value added per man-hour series does not show the downward 
movement in comparative labour productivity that is so typical of the comparative 
value added per worker series. There is no sign anymore of a ‘temporary cyclical 
narrowing’ of the gap before WWII, but an upward trend from the end of the 
nineteenth century to well after WWII instead. After the war there is still a gap 
between the two series which persists well into the 1960s. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
We conclude from this new series that there is a clear trend in the widening of the 
Anglo-American productivity gap when we measure productivity in terms of actual 
hours worked. This long term process appears not to have been affected greatly by the 
exogenous shocks of the world wars. During this period U.S. manufacturing increased 
its productivity lead (measured in hours) over the U.K. from less than 200 percent in 
1889 to over 300 percent in the 1950s. This implies, that the stylized fact of a 2:1 
productivity ratio between the U.S. and the U.K. can only be substantiated using the 
concept of labour productivity per worker. But especially in transatlantic comparisons 
it is important to employ the proper measure of productivity based on actual hours 
worked. Productivity measured in hours thus provides a fundamentally different 
picture of the long-term comparative industrial performance of the U.S. 
 
VI. LONG-TERM MOVEMENTS OF COMPARATIVE PRODUCTIVITY BY 
BRANCH 
 
In order to determine the driving forces behind the strong and prolonged growth in 
comparative American productivity we will now approach the issue from a lower 
level of aggregation. For the year 1935 we have already established that the American 
productivity lead was widespread across all industries, but that the engineering, 
chemical, and clothing branches in particular contributed to the comparative 
productivity gap between these two countries. Still this does not explain how the U.S. 
was able to continuously outperform the U.K. in terms of manufacturing productivity 
growth over the entire first part of the twentieth century.  
Disentangling each industry’s individual contribution to overall sectoral 
productivity growth can be done by shift-share analysis. It measures both the impact 
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of shifts in the employment structure (the shift component) and relative increases in 
labour productivity by industry (the share component). In our case we opted for a 
base-invariant shift-share formula in order to reduce the bias that occurs due to 
changes in the employment structure and in the relative industry-specific 
productivity.50 We realize that the shift-share analysis is unable to account for inter-
industry linkages - for which a total economy input-output framework is required - 
and may thus underestimate the relative contributions of some industries that have 
strong forward linkages to other manufacturing industries. Still these ties are unlikely 
to be so strong as to drastically influence the results of the shift-share analysis as 
presented in Table 6. 
We distinguish between 6 major branches and a shift component which 
together cover the entire manufacturing sector. These individual series were 
calculated from the existing estimates for U.S. and U.K. manufacturing by John 
Kendrick and Charles Feinstein respectively, and underlie the series for total 
manufacturing already shown in Figure 3.51 In addition to the figures by Kendrick we 
used Census data for the U.S. - compiled by Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman - for 
aggregation and detailed statistics on employment and hours worked.52 We 
supplemented the figures by Feinstein with disaggregated figures on hours worked 
from the sources listed in Figure 3.  
We cover the period 1900-1957 and distinguish between 5 different periods; 
1900-1913 (pre-WW I), 1913-1924 (trans-WW I), 1924-1937 (interwar), 1937-1950 
(trans-WW II), 1950-1957 (post-WW II). These periods were chosen to represent 
more or less similar phases of economic development for both economies. We took 
particular care to start and end these sub periods in similar phases of the business 
cycle (‘peak’ or ‘standard’ years) for both economies in order to obtain a 
representative estimate of the growth in labour productivity in the manufacturing 
sector. Because of the turbulent years of the first half of the twentieth century it is 
very difficult to pinpoint the exact periods of economic expansion, in particular for 
the years following WW I. The selection of representative years was hampered also 
by discontinuities in the available statistics. This is particularly true for the U.K. in the 
years directly following WW I, which prompted John Dowie to express his doubts 
                                                 
50 Timmer, Dynamics, p. 110 The base-invariant shift-share decomposition uses weights from both the 
start of the period, superscript 0, and the end of the period, superscript T. LP denotes the labour 


























51 Kendrick, Productivity, pp. 465-475; Feinstein, Statistical, pp. T111-T113, T130. 
52 Atack and Bateman, “Manufacturing”, Historical Statistics, pp. 579-619. For earlier years the 
disaggregated figures listed by Atack and Bateman were incomplete, we adjusted for this using census 
data taken directly from the Quinquennial and Biannual Censuses of Manufactures. U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Census, various issues. 
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regarding the employment figures for this period.53 We defined the wartime phases as 
1913-1924 and 1937-1950 - broadly in line with Robert Matthews, Charles Feinstein 
and John Odling-Smee - to circumvent this issue and to include the periods of postwar 
recovery.54 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the shift-share analysis in terms of contributions to 
average annual logarithmic growth of labour productivity per man-hour for the U.S. 
and the U.K. In addition, the table shows the relative growth of the U.S. compared to 
the U.K. which can be conveniently expressed as the difference between the U.S. and 
U.K. estimates. 
 Productivity in the American manufacturing sector has grown on average by 
2.6 percent each year over the entire period. Growth rates were between 2 and 3 
percent annually across the 5 time phases with a peak of 3.5 percent annual growth in 
the interwar years. Growth in productivity was primarily driven by the engineering 
and the paper, printing and miscellaneous branches. However, for the post-1913 
period we should also include chemicals and food as major contributors to the 
American manufacturing productivity surge. In general, the contribution of the 
reallocation of labour inputs, the shift effect, is negligible or in some cases even 
negative. Labour shifted primarily from the food and textile branches to chemicals 
and engineering. In the case of chemicals, this caused a positive shift effect since the 
latter had a substantially higher relative productivity level. However, this effect was 
largely canceled out by shifts of labour towards the engineering branch, which had a 
below average productivity level, thus resulting in a negative shift effect. 
 The following picture emerges for the U.K.: Total manufacturing growth was 
on average 1.9 percent per year, with a clear peak in average productivity growth rates 
during the trans-WW I period and the interwar years as well. Long term growth was 
driven by the engineering and the paper, printing and miscellaneous branches. 
Textiles showed a remarkable contribution to overall productivity growth in the 
interwar period. British manufacturing productivity did benefit more from changes in 
the structure of employment than American industry. Labour was reallocated from the 
large and relatively low-productive textile industry to chemicals and engineering. 
 In comparative terms the U.S. was able to outperform the British 
manufacturing sector by 3 quarters of a percentage point per year on average. The 
effect of this was a steadily widening of the productivity gap between the two 
countries as shown in Figure 3; the cumulative effect being well over 50 percent of 
comparative growth over the entire period. Comparative U.S./U.K. productivity 
                                                 
53 Dowie, ‘1919-20’. 
54 Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee, British Economic, p. 22. 
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growth was positive in all periods. Regardless of its small share in the employment 
structure, the chemical branch was by far the greatest contributor to the comparative 
U.S. productivity performance in manufacturing. Fast productivity growth in the U.S. 
food, drink and tobacco branch exerted upward pressure in the interwar period. This 
may partly be the result of a statistical artifact, because with the lifting of the 
Prohibition in 1933 the production of liquor became legal and therefore entered the 
statistical records again. Engineering contributed in particular to the widening gap 
during the trans-WW II period. The U.K. was able – especially between 1913 and 
1924 - to counter the increasing lead of the U.S. by the reallocation of labour, as can 
be seen from the predominantly negative comparative shift effect. After 1937 the 
statistical effect of comparative shifts became unimportant. If we take the shift 
component out of account and solely look at comparative productivity growth within 
the branches (see column INTRA) we find a fairly constant rise in U.S. labour 
productivity compared to the U.K. of nearly 0.9 percent annually. Comparative hourly 
productivity growth within the branches does not reveal an extraordinary American 
productivity bonus related to the world wars. Both periods conform to the long-term 
pattern of persistently higher comparative U.S. productivity improvements. 
We can also use the time-series estimates of branches to make a forward 
projection from our 1935 benchmark and make a level comparison with the 1950-
U.S./U.K. labour productivity benchmark by Paige and Bombach.55 Labour input for 
the 1950 benchmark was adjusted for hours worked to allow for a comparison with 
our forward projection from the new 1935 benchmark. The results from Paige and 
Bombach and our projections are similar in the sense that the textile, food, and metal 
manufacturing branches form the lower part in the spread of comparative productivity 
levels in the post-WWII period. For some of these groups of industries we find only 
small differences between our projections and the Paige and Bombach benchmark 
estimates. They estimated comparative U.S./U.K. labour productivity in textiles at 
about 224, food at 209, and metals at 289. Our projections from the 1935 benchmark 
are 229, 164, and 323 respectively for the same groups in 1950. The differences 
between our projections and the direct benchmark in textiles and metals fall within a 
margin of ten to eleven percent. In the case of food, drink and tobacco the time-series 
projection from the 1935 benchmark results in a twenty percent lower level than the 
outcome of Paige and Bombach. 
Bigger differences show up in the engineering and chemical industries, 
together accounting for 25 percent of manufacturing employment and 29 percent of 
value added in both the American and British census of 1935. For the year 1950 Paige 
and Bombach estimated the American productivity level in engineering at 358 percent 
of the British level. The level in chemicals (including petroleum and fertilisers) was 
                                                 
55 Paige and Bombach, Comparison. 
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estimated at 367 percent. However, the projections from our 1935-benchmark show 
substantially higher levels for 1950: 530 and 500 for engineering and chemicals 
respectively. Thus we find that the two American sectors outpaced their British 
counterparts in productivity levels as well as in growth rates. Should we accept our 
new benchmark estimate for 1935 as well as the 1950-benchmark estimate of Paige 
and Bombach, then we would run into problems of consistency. For example in the 
case of engineering, we would have to conclude that there was a moderate U.S./U.K. 
comparative productivity decline between 1935 (410) and 1950 (358). This is not 
consistent with the information we can extract from the existing time-series estimates 
in Table 6, which suggest very fast American productivity growth in engineering and 
only a moderate performance in the U.K. between 1937 and 1950. Traditional index 
number problems may play a role here but our opinion is that Paige and Bombach’s 
estimate is too low. It is certainly true that they set out the methodology of double 
deflation, but in practice they did not fully implement it in manufacturing. This was 
also the case with engineering and chemicals. In fact, for chemicals they encountered 
the same kind of measurement problems as in Rostas’s comparison. Being not able to 
address the issue of comparing the many non-homogeneous items in this branch, they 
had to rely on a small number of price and quantity comparisons: ‘…The results 
cannot, therefore, be given the same degree of reliability as those for more 
homogeneous industries.’56 For the moment the discrepancy remains. To solve this 
productivity puzzle it will be necessary to re-examine the existing 1950-benchmark 
and apply the methodology that we set out in this paper. 
 
VII. EXPLAINING THE INTERWAR PRODUCTIVITY GAP 
 
Stephen Broadberry and Nick Crafts have tried to quantify the fundamental long-run 
explanatory forces underlying the U.S/U.K. manufacturing productivity gap. Their 
regression estimates included effects from higher concentration ratios and lower 
quality of human capital in British industries.57 Restrictive practices in interwar 
Britain may also have hampered competition and the necessary economic adjustment 
to new technologies. There was less rapid technical change compared with the U.S., 
maintaining a low effort equilibrium that was carried over into the postwar period.58 
Leslie Hannah has stressed the detrimental influence of protectionism and of the wars 
on European performance: ‘…it is surely not necessary to look much further for the 
sources of the American miracle than the geopolitical maladies that afflicted her 
major potential competitors.’59    
                                                 
56 Paige and Bombach, Comparison, p. 37. 
57 Broadberry, Productivity Race; Broadberry and Crafts, ‘Britain’s’. 
58 Broadberry and Crafts, ‘Britain’s’, p. 554;  Magee, ‘ Manufacturing’, p. 95. See also note 51. 
59 Hannah, ‘American’, p. 210. 
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However, British performance in manufacturing was relatively high during the trans-
WWI and interwar periods and this suggests that focussing on ‘European failure’ is 
only part of the story. We believe that it is also necessary to explain the sources of 
American success as well. American comparative performance resulted from strong 
domestic modernization in the key sectors of the Second Industrial Revolution. 
American manufacturing managed to expand much faster those sectors in which it 
already had comparative and competitive leadership. Some sectors could even take 
another leap during the Depression. Part of this acceleration of the American 
productivity level during the interwar period may well have been of a cyclical nature. 
Claudia Goldin has pointed to mechanisms of selective retention in the 1930s: 
Workers who were laid off were less productive.60 This explains the phenomenon of 
rising real wages and the persistence of high unemployment in the U.S. However, 
measured within a period of a full cycle between 1929 and 1941 there has been found 
a positive relationship between a rise in the unemployment rate and a decline in total 
factor productivity (TFP), which suggests a pro-cyclicality of productivity.61 We 
conclude that this issue has not been settled yet.  
The role of physical capital deepening as a decisive factor in the interwar 
productivity growth in the United States is also under discussion. Field has shown 
with estimations based on Kendrick’s study that rates of TFP growth and rates of 
output per hour were very similar between 1919 and 1941.62 This leads to the 
conclusion that disembodied technical change in particular has been responsible for 
an outward shift of the American production possibility frontier. Anecdotal evidence 
of many important process and product breakthroughs as drivers of productivity 
advance are mentioned in the literature, such as floor space savings, automatic process 
control, larger units of installations, increased thermal efficiency, improved materials, 
and fundamental new processes like the switch from coal based to petroleum based 
chemical technologies.  
There was also a change in the composition of firms within and between 
industries. Within industries we find examples of productivity improvements as an 
indirect effect of the Depression. Due to the fall in demand weak firms went out of 
business. The American motor vehicles industry provides an archetypical example of 
growth of efficiency within an industry. Timothy Bresnahan and Daniel Raff used an 
establishment-level panel dataset and showed that the removal of the low productivity 
tail in the spread of plants was responsible for a one-off change in the composition of 
                                                 
60 Cited in Field, ‘ Most’, p. 1409; Bernanke, ‘Employment’, p. 91: mentions the role of a changing 
skill mix over the cycle; Margo, ‘Microeconomics’, pp. 333-41: mentions the higher age and the lower 
levels of schooling of the unemployed; see also Margo, ‘Employment’, p. 46. 
61 Bernanke and Parkinson, ‘Procyclical’, p. 457, find procyclical patterns due to labour hoarding in 
steel, rubber, and stone, clay and glass. See also Field, ‘Impact’, p. 687. 
62 Field, ‘Impact’, p.5. In contrast, the post-1941 period reveals much larger growth rates of output per 
working hour compared with TFP. For the basic time-series see Kendrick, Productivity. 
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the total industry, leading to an increase of the average productivity level.63 Only the 
large motor-vehicle production plants survived in the Depression years and new 
entrants had a higher productivity. Evolutionary processes like these were the effect 
of changed technological practice in the industry as a whole. If we calculate from our 
present figures the comparative level of hourly productivity for motor vehicles 
between the U.S. and the U.K. we arrive at a real productivity level of 590 (double 
deflated). Likewise we find for 1935 very high levels of hourly labour productivity in 
a wide range of industries, such as  hosiery (339), blast furnaces (405), electrical 
engineering (389), chocolate and sugar confectioning (340), and rubber (300).64 Fast 
comparative productivity advances were manifest in many branches in American 
manufacturing, particularly in engineering, chemicals, and food production. Figure 3 
confirms that the post-Depression period was an era in which the productivity lead of 
the U.S. was strengthened further. And table 6 shows that the long term forces of this 
process were already in place in the 1920s, setting the stage for the expansion of those 
industries that already had high comparative productivity levels. Our comparative 
data show that it is not the Second World War that was the decisive factor in widening 
the transatlantic productivity gap.65 The 1930s witnessed the implementation and 
exploitation of new technologies and practices which were to form the basis of much 
of the labour and multifactor productivity of the post-war period. The advance 
reflected also the movement along scientific and technological trajectories relatively 
unaffected by the macroeconomic downturn. Field stressed e.g. the role of a maturing 
privately funded R&D system, and the expansion of R&D-labs, -employment, and -
expenditure during the Depression years. This factor was particularly relevant in some 




This paper presents an industry-of-origin study dealing with the American and British 
manufacturing sector in the interwar period. We have used the census reports of 1935 
to calculate Anglo-American comparative labour productivity levels for all 
manufacturing industries. The input-output structure of both economies has been used 
to calculate prices of intermediate inputs, which made it possible to estimate double 
deflate value added. We find a comparative American/British manufacturing 
                                                 
63 Bresnahan and Raff, ‘Intra-Industry’. 
64 However, comparative data from the 1935-censuses of both countries reveals additional information 
that explains the high productivity level. American car manufacturers acquired a much larger 
percentage of gross output from intermediate inputs and components obtained from industries lower in 
the chain (70%) against Britain (40%) which points at a more developed pattern of specialization in the 
U.S. Lewchuk, ‘Motor’, pp. 138-42. See also our Table 4 for the statistics of the total motor and cycle 
branch on a per worker basis. The other productivity measures in Table 3 are also on a per worker 
basis.  
65 Field, ‘Technological’, pp. 206, 214-215. Field, ‘Impact’. 
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productivity level of 224 on a per worker basis. On the level of branches and 
individual industries the differences in results from the varying research strategies are 
substantial and highlight the superior performance of U.S. manufacturing. 
Adjusting for actual hours worked is essential in the U.S./U.K. comparison 
because average annual hours worked on both sides of the Atlantic diverged a lot in 
the interwar period. Expressed in hours worked the American comparative 
productivity level increases to a level of 279 in 1935. Hours-adjustment also changes 
the trend in long term comparative productivity in manufacturing between the two 
countries. Comparative U.S./U.K. hourly productivity steadily moved from a level of 
200 around 1900 to a level of 300 in the trans-WWII period. The American miracle of 
the twentieth century is therefore not only a matter of shifts from labour out of 
agriculture and of comparative productivity increases in the service sector, but 
foremost a process of productivity growth within manufacturing itself. Evidence from 
time-series data suggests that the drivers of the productivity differential between the 
U.S. and the U.K. were the chemical and engineering industries. These branches made 
up 25 percent of employment in manufacturing. This finding is well in line with 
recent interpretations of post-Depression developments in technological capabilities 
and productivity growth in American manufacturing. 
 
 
[Appendix A here] 
[Appendix B.1 here] 
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[Appendix C here] 
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Table 1. Purchasing Power Parities in Manufacturing, U.K. and U.S., 1935 
 
 
Gross output PPP 
($ / £) 
 Intermediate input PPP 
($ / £) ‡ 
 Value added PPP 




Paasche Fisher  Laspey-
res 
Paasche Fisher  Laspey-
res 
Paasche Fisher 
Textiles 6.4 5.5 5.9  6.2 5.2 5.7 (5.5) 6.7 5.9 6.3 
Leather 5.6 5.9 5.8  5.5 5.8 5.7 5.7 6.1 5.9 
Clothing 5.3 5.0 5.1  6.1 5.4 5.7 4.3 4.5 4.4 
Iron and steel 5.6 5.4 5.5  5.8 5.2 5.5 (5.4) 5.3 5.6 5.4 
Engineering, shipbuilding, vehicles 4.3 3.9 4.1  5.4 4.9 5.1 3.2 3.1 3.2 
Non-ferrous metals 5.4 5.2 5.3  5.4 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.2 
Food, drink and tobacco 5.9 5.2 5.5  5.7 5.7 5.7 6.2 4.2 5.1 
Chemical and allied products 5.1 3.2 4.1  5.3 3.8 4.5 4.9 2.6 3.5 
Clay and building materials 5.4 5.5 5.5       
Timber 2.2 2.2 2.2       
Paper 4.0 3.7 3.9  4.1 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Miscellaneous 6.2 4.5 5.3  5.3 5.7 5.5 7.1 3.8 5.2 
Total manufacturing 5.4 4.3 4.8  5.5 4.9 5.2 5.3 3.7 4.4 
 
Sources: Barna,  ‘Interdependence’; Leontief, Structure; additional sources see Appendix B. 
‡) The intermediate input PPPs are based on output UVRs of intermediate products weighted by data on the flow of these goods from input-output tables. 
The intermediate input PPPs between brackets are based on input UVRs taken directly from the British and American census (see Appendix D for further 
details). 
ζ) The value added PPPs are based on the input-output weighted intermediate input PPPs and the single deflated gross output PPPs. The Laspeyres and 




































 Table 2. Comparative Productivity in Manufacturing, U.K. and U.S., 1935 
 Real Value Added per Worker 
 (% U.S. / U.K.) 





Textiles    144 (136) 150 152
Leather    157 148 
Clothing    237 223 167
Iron and steel    186 (177) 191 209
Engineering, shipbuilding, vehicles    327 235 261
Non-ferrous metals    182 156 
Food, drink and tobacco    152 222 195
Chemicals and allied products    263 235 212
Clay and building materials    201 222 204
Timber    293 129 
Paper    278 223 243
Miscellaneous    231 226 242
Total manufacturing    224 211 212ξ
 
Sources: Rostas, L. (1948), Comparative;see Appendix B for further details. 
‡) The value added per worker estimates for this study were deflated by the ‘input-output’ (Fisher) double 
deflated value added PPPs listed in Table 1, with the exception of the ‘clay and building materials’ and 
‘timber’ branches which were deflated by (Fisher) single deflated gross output PPPs. The figures in brackets 
were deflated by ‘standard’ (Fisher) double deflated value added PPPs based on input UVRs taken directly 
from the British and American census. 
ζ) The value added per worker estimates deflated by the overall official exchange rate, which was 
approximately 4.94 U.S. dollars per pound sterling. 
ξ) The figure for the manufacturing sector as a whole as listed in Rostas, Comparative. Due to the reduced 
coverage of the Rostas study it is not possible to assign weights to his branch estimates to arrive at the same 
value for manufacturing as a whole. 
 
 







in gross output (%) 
 
Fisher purchasing power 
parity ($ / £) 
 
 Real Value 
Added per 
Worker 











Cotton 71 61 5.7 5.4 6.2 142 
Electrical engineering 46 43 4.1 5.4 3.4 318 
Motor and cycle  57 71 3.9 4.9 2.5 462 
Chemicals, dyestuffs, drugs 46 42 4.0 4.5 3.6 269 
Rubber 49 54 4.6 5.1 4.1 222 
       
Sources: see Appendix B for details. 
 
 


















Textiles 47.7 2,250 35.8 1,774 
Leather 48.8 2,302 38.6 1,915 
Clothing 45.4 2,142 32.2 1,597 
Iron and steel 48.2 2,274 36.6 1,813 
Engineering, shipbuilding, vehicles 48.2 2,274 36.5 1,809 
Non-ferrous metals 48.2 2,274 37.1‡ 1,838‡ 
Food, drink and tobacco 48.5 2,288 39.5 1,962 
Chemicals and allied products 48.0 2,264 38.1 1,892 
Clay and building materials 48.0 2,264 36.5 1,812 
Timber 48.3 2,278 39.5 1,958 
Paper 48.6 2,292 38.2 1,896 
Miscellaneous 48.2 2,274 33.9 1,682 
Total manufacturing 47.8 2,255 36.6 1,817 
 
Sources: ILO, Year-book, 1939; HMSO Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour 
Statistics, 1971; Huberman and Minns, ‘Times.’ 
‡) The sectoral averages - provided by the 1939 Yearbook of Labour Statistics - were used when detailed 
industry level data for hours worked was unavailable.
 
 
Table 5. Real Value Added per Worker and per Hour, U.K. and U.S., 1935 
  
Value Added per 
Worker‡ 
  
Value Added per 
Hour‡ 
Branch / Sector 
 
(% U.S. / U.K.)  (% U.S. / U.K.)
Textiles 144 182 
Leather 157 190 
Clothing 237 318 
Iron and steel 186 235 
Engineering, shipbuilding, vehicles 327 410 
Non-ferrous metals 182 226 
Food, drink and tobacco 152 177 
Chemicals and allied products 263 316 
Clay and building materials 201 253 
Timber 293 345 
Paper 278 338 
Miscellaneous 231 313 
Total manufacturing 224 279 
 
Sources: see table 3 and table 4 for further details. 
‡) The value added per worker/man-hour estimates were deflated by the (Fisher) double deflated value 
added PPPs listed in table 1, with the exception of the ‘clay and building materials’ and ‘timber’ branches 




Table 6. Sectoral Contributions to Annual Manufacturing Productivity Growth, U.K. and 
U.S.,  
  1900-1957 (%) 
                  



































 (TOT) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (SHIFT) 
1900-1913‡ 2.20 0.07 0.36 0.09 0.60 0.37 0.76 -0.04
1913-1923 2.77 0.32 0.65 0.41 0.13 0.77 0.48 0.03
1923-1937 3.45 0.62 0.57 0.51 0.26 0.63 0.80 0.06
1937-1950 2.23 0.24 0.17 0.52 0.36 0.52 0.35 0.06
1950-1957 2.62 0.40 0.31 0.56 0.14 0.55 0.59 0.08
1900-1957 2.64 0.35 0.37 0.40 0.27 0.60 0.58 0.07
    
 
United Kingdom (U.K.) 
 
 (TOT) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (SHIFT) 
1900-1913 1.07 0.17 0.31 0.16 0.04 0.23 0.32 -0.17
1913-1923 2.55 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.22 0.74 0.58 0.46
1923-1937 2.58 0.31 0.51 0.14 0.19 0.55 0.60 0.28
1937-1950 1.40 0.31 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.48 0.13
1950-1957 1.89 0.14 0.05 0.35 0.20 0.47 0.51 0.18
1900-1957 1.88 0.22 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.45 0.49 0.18
    
 
Difference (U.S. - U.K.) 
 (TOT) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (SHIFT) (INTRA)
1900-1913‡ 1.13 -0.10 0.05 -0.07 0.56 0.14 0.43 0.13 1.00
1913-1923 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.32 -0.10 0.03 -0.11 -0.43 0.64
1923-1937 0.86 0.32 0.05 0.37 0.07 0.08 0.19 -0.22 1.08
1937-1950 0.82 -0.07 0.05 0.45 0.26 0.33 -0.13 -0.06 0.89
1950-1957 0.73 0.27 0.26 0.21 -0.07 0.09 0.08 -0.10 0.83
1900-1957 0.77 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.09 -0.11 0.88
        
Sources:  
- U.S. from Kendrick, Productivity, pp. 465-475; Atack and Bateman, “Manufacturing”, Historical Statistics, pp. 579-619; 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Manufactures, various issues; Hours of Work: see table 4 and figure 3. 
- U.K. from Feinstein, Statistical, pp. T111-T113, T130; Broadberry, Productivity Race, pp. 43-46; Hours of Work: see table 4 
and figure 3. 
‡) Data for the American manufacturing branches was only available for the year 1899; therefore the first U.S. period runs 
from 1899-1913. Time series for total manufacturing do suggest however that this has extremely little effect on the final 





























- U.K. from Boyer and Hatton, ‘New Estimates.’ 
- U.S. from Darby, ‘Three-and-a-Half.’ 
 
























- Germany from Länderrat des Amerikanische Besatzungsgebiet, Statistisches Handbuch, 1949 and 
Huberman and Minns, ‘Times’, p. 546. 
- U.K. from Hart, ‘Hours’ and Colin Clark, Conditions;  Metcalf et al., ‘Still’, p. 397. 





Figure 3. Comparative Labour Productivity in Manufacturing, U.S. and U.K. 













































































U.S. VA per worker
U.S. VA per hour
 Sources:  
- Benchmark (1935) from own calculations. 
- Time Series Output and Employment from Broadberry, Productivity Race. 
- U.K. Hours of Work from Huberman and Minns, ‘Times’; Hart, ‘Hours’;  Colin Clark, Conditions; ILO, 
Year-book, 1931, 1939 and 1962; ; The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 
Total Economy Database, January 2007, www.ggdc.net 
- U.S. Hours of Work from Jones, ‘New Estimates’ and Huberman and Minns, ‘Times’; The Conference 
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